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Abstract 
Prior research suggests that international experience only are directly learnt by firms’ international 
operations. In this study, we argue that majority shareholders are part and parcel of the network of internal and 
external international experience. Based on the sample of 307 cross-border M&A of 741 majority shareholders 
in 188 Chinese listing enterprises for the 2005–2014 time period, we measure direct international experience 
and indirect international experience using centrality analysis in two-model social network. We find that 
internal and external international experience jointly facilitate cross-border M&A. Furthermore, the moderate 
effect of ownership structure on the relationship between different international experience and cross-border 
M&A are complete opposite. 
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1. Main text  
The conceptualization of international experience, is the extent to which the firm’s international experience 
can be learnt and applied across its international operations, giving its role in explaining firm 
internationalization [1]. From the knowledge based view and transaction cost economics, firms’ prior 
international experience represented firm-specific knowledge that is difficult to imitate [2], helps reduce the 
risks involved in going abroad, influences managers’ perceived costs of internationalization [3-4] and make 
greater commitments to a foreign investment. Nevertheless, as the value of international experience lies in the 
FSAs that the firm develops as a consequence of its experience, whether can firms acquire or gain access to 
international experience from other sources? [5]. A key objective of this paper is to propose an explanation for 
this puzzle. Our explanation as well as its test makes several novel contributions to the relevant literature using 
ample of 307 cross-border merge and acquisition (M&A) of 741 majority shareholders in 188 Chinese listing 
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enterprises for the 2005–2014 time period. 
First, international experience are divided into two parts based on their sources. We accept the traditional 
premise that direct international experience are learnt by doing [6]. However, we argue that this premise is 
logically compatible with the idea that indirect international experience are learnt by alliances. For example, 
majority shareholders in a listing company are kind of capitalism alliances [7] or strategic alliances [8]. Put 
simply, we propose that direct and indirect international experience jointly facilitate the probability and 
acquired equity of cross-border M&A. 
Second, we measure direct and indirect international experience using centrality analysis in two-model 
social network. Many large real-world networks, which are composed of a number of actors and some events, 
exhibit a two-mode nature [9] because the events and actors are linked by the affiliations, relationships or 
interactions between them [10]. The relationship between the cross-shareholders and cross-border M&A (S–M) 
is not only an investment relationship but also a type of affiliation relationship [11]. We propose that degree 
centrality (DC) presents direct international experience, which means the cross-border M&A involvement of 
shareholders; betweenness centrality (BC) refers indirect international experience, which evaluate the alliances 
between each pair of shareholders. 
Third, our empirical analysis also uniquely highlights an important but underexplored moderate effect of 
ownership structure on the relationship between international experience and cross-border M&A. Our results 
show that highly concentrated ownership structure helps strength the positive relationship between direct 
international experience and cross-border M&A, but weaken the positive relationship between indirect 
international experience and cross-border M&A. 
Our arguments and evidence are critical to understanding the direct international experience learnt by doing 
and indirect international experience learnt by alliances. We point out that moderate effect of ownership 
structure are complete opposite of the relationship between direct and indirect international experience and 
cross-border M&A. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First the literature review that has 
inspired our research questions is explored. Next, the hypothesis is described, followed by the research design. 
At last, we analysis the result and make conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
The firms’ shareholders (principals) are interested in a maximization of the firm value. While firm 
internationalization are accompanied by huge risk, there is a positive relationship between the degree of 
internationalization and the market value of equity [12]. In this context various researchers highlight risks such 
as ‘‘liability of foreignness’’ and ‘‘double-layered acculturation’’ [13].Shareholders other than management can 
potentially influence the actions taken by management [14-15]. The cross-border M&A process is a complex 
systematic project, which run through numerous essential stages. Very and Schweiger [16] identify four stages 
about an cross-border acquisition strategy: identifying, selecting, and analyzing acquisition candidates; target 
analysis, first contacts, valuing and pricing, structuring deals; negotiating with targets and other stakeholders; 
the post-acquisition integrating. International experience is important in explaining the internationalization 
pattern of firms in the inter nationalization process model [1]. An important aspect of the conceptualization of 
traditional international experience, given its role in explaining firm internationalization process, is the extent 
to which the firm’s international experience can be acquired and applied across its international operations [5].  
According to organizational learning and knowledge literature, international experience are divided into 
two types: explicit knowledge which is more easily codified and tacit knowledge which is difficult to codify or 
explain. Rugman & Verbeke [17] link the source of the firm’s international tacit experience to the type of FSA, 
namely location-bound FSAs versus non-location-bound FSAs. Non-location-bound FSAs were traditionally 
considered to be exploitable globally without significant adaptation, but are now thought to be limited in their 
application to the firm’s home region [18], such as government approval support. In contrast, location-bound 
FSAs can only be exploited in a specific location or set of locations, because firms develop them in response to 
‘specific local customer needs and market conditions, as well as government regulation’ [17] in host country, 
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such as post-acquisition integrating. These direct international experience are learnt by doing shown in left side 
of Figure 1. ଵܵ, ܵଶ, ܵଷ and ܵସ represent four majority shareholders of firm A and ܯ is one of cross-border M&A 
of firm A. 
 
 
Figure 1 Direct experience and indirect experience 
Nevertheless, as the value of international experience lies in the FSAs that the firm develops as a 
consequence of its experience, whether can firms acquire or gain access to international experience from other 
sources? The prior studies identified rarely address these substitutes for international experience. Clarke, 
Tamaschke & Liesch [13] propose some substitutes for direct international experience, such as, alliances with 
internationally experienced firms. Majority shareholders in a listing company are kind of capitalism alliances [7] 
or strategic alliances [8]. They learn by alliances shown in right side of Figure 1. ଵܵ  and ܵଶ  represent two 
majority shareholders of firm A, and ܯ is one of cross-border M&A  that they participate. ଵܵ and ܵଶ connected 
with ܯ learn by doing and form direct international experience displayed by solid line. ଵܵ and ܵଶ connected 
with each other learn by alliances and form indirect international experience displayed by dashed line.. 
3. Hypotheses 
3.1. International experience and cross-border M&A 
While a substantial amount of attention within social network analysis (SNA) has been given to the study of 
one-mode networks, there is an increasing consideration of two-mode networks [19]. It is now recognized that 
such data are particularly important [9] [19-20]. These kind of social network relations consist of the linkages 
among actors through their joint participation in social activities or membership in collectivities [21]. Such 
networks of actors tied to each other through their participation in activities, and activities linked through 
multiple memberships of actors, are referred to as affiliation networks, membership networks, dual networks, 
or hyper networks [22-23]. A theoretically important property of an affiliation network is that actors create 
linkages between events and events create linkages between actors. Formally, a two-mode network consists of 
two key elements: a set of actors and a collection of subsets of actors (called events) [21].  
Nevertheless, the decision as to whether to opt for full or partial ownership in a foreign investment carries 
significant strategic importance owing to the inherent benefits and risks of each foreign establishment and entry 
mode [24]. From the knowledge based view, a firm’s prior entry experience represents firm-specific knowledge 
that is difficult to imitate [2]. Simultaneously, according to transaction cost economics, firms with prior entry 
experience develop organizational capabilities that enable them to make greater commitments to a foreign 
investment. In addition to a local knowledge base, firms’ prior international experience helps reduce the risks 
involved in going abroad and influences managers’ perceived costs of internationalization [3-4]. From the 
above, more direct international experience learnt by doing help multinational corporations decrease the 
uncertainty of environment and overcome the liability of foreignness. 
Hypothesis 1a: Direct international experience learnt by doing will facilitate cross-border M&A. 
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Preceding arguments assume firms gain crucial knowledge about home and host countries and develop 
organizational capabilities only through incremental and time consuming learning-by-doing processes of 
conducting business abroad [25]. Empirical studies suggest that a transfer of knowledge may considerably 
benefit from embeddedness into networks [26]. As one kind of alliances between major shareholders, the 
opportunities for interfirm transfer of capabilities afforded by different alliance structures influences the choice 
among them, since equity-based joint ventures are more effective vehicles for the transfer of tacit knowledge 
between the partners [27]. These external relationships permit shareholders to access explicit knowledge 
possessed by its alliance partners. Collaborative equity-based alliances that involve the exchange and sharing of 
multiple resources for the development of international experience and information also helps reduce the risks 
involved in going abroad and influences managers’ perceived costs of internationalization. These arguments 
lead to the first cluster of hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1b: Indirect international experience learnt by alliances will facilitate cross-border M&A. 
3.2. International experience, ownership structure and cross-border M&A 
Eclectic paradigm [28] highlights the importance of the advantages of ownership in shaping 
internationalization decisions. In order to overcome the differences in risk preferences and the incongruence of 
goals between principals and agents in typical agency relationships, ownership gives CEOs and TMTs an 
incentive to assume the potential risks associated with international expansion. Oesterle, Richta, & Fisch [29] 
test that the degree of ownership concentration has a complex impact on the choice where the firm conducts its 
international activities. 
As many multinational firms in reality with multiple shareholders such a structure appears to be suboptimal 
for governance [30], leads to a free-rider problem: each investor individually has insufficient incentives to bear 
the cost of monitoring and participation. While splitting a block reduces the effectiveness of direct intervention, 
it increases the power of a second governance mechanism: speculative trading [31]. Since cross-border M&A 
provide a rich opportunity for knowledge spillovers, the shareholders following the “Wall Street Rule” of 
“voting with their feet” are difficult to gain experience of cross-border M&A. Consequently, majority 
shareholders with greater direct international experience face fewer local knowledge disadvantages through 
learning by doing in firms with highly concentrated shareholders. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Highly concentrated ownership structure helps strength the positive relationship between 
direct international experience and cross-border M&A. 
 
 
Figure 2  The conceptual model 
 
Social network theorists have focused much of their attention on structural properties of networks [32], 
such as tie strength at the dyadic level. Tie strength characterizes the closeness of a relationship between two 
parties, in our case experience share and knowledge source, and is as a combination of closeness and 
interaction frequency of shareholders. Weak ties are less costly to maintain, having a network of predominantly 
Direct international experience
Learn by doing (tacit knowledge)
Indirect international experience
Learn by alliances (explicit knowledge)
Cross-border 
M&A
Ownership 
structure
H1: +
H2: +
H3: +
H4: -
Knowledge-Based theory Internationalization
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weak ties is advantageous for firms requiring the receipt of mostly explicit knowledge. In firms with highly 
concentrated shareholders (family business and state owned enterprises), while strong ties with stable and 
trusting relationships lead to greater knowledge exchange, interaction of explicit and tacit knowledge are quite 
homogeneous [33]. Consequently, weak ties in firms with highly dispersed shareholders, access to more 
indirect international experience through learning by alliances, which help overcome the liability of foreignness. 
Then, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: Highly concentrated ownership structure helps weaken the positive relationship between 
indirect international experience and cross-border M&A. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the conceptual model. 
4. Research design 
We test our hypotheses on a sample of Chinese listing corporations, deriving our sample from M&A 
database of Thomson Reuters. Since the restructuring of the government and enterprises started in 2005, 
which leaded to the cross-shareholding in Chinese listing enterprises, we collect our data from 2005 
onwards. After deleting cases with missing values, there are a sample of 307 cross-border M&A of 741 
major shareholders in Chinese listing enterprises for the 2005–2014 time period. 
4.1. Dependent variables 
We choose M&A success as the dependent variable of our study, which is a broadly discussed issue in the 
M&A literature. M&A success of 307 cross-border M&A have four conditions, completed, pending, withdrawn 
and unknown. Based on annual report of list companies, we check these information again. We categorize 
acquisitions completed after public announcement as 1, and other withdrawn or pending acquisitions as 0. This 
categorization method has been also used on the likelihood of completion such as Rossi & Volpin [34-35]. 
4.2. Independent variables 
The relationship between the cross-shareholders and cross-border M&A (S–M) is not only an investment 
relationship but also a type of affiliation relationship [11]. Usually, the network constructed by the so-called 
affiliation relationship is one of the two-mode networks, and it is also known as the membership-network or the 
hyper-network [22]. The two-mode network is often formed by a set of actors (ܵ) as well as a set of events (ܯ). 
Figure 4 shows the relationship matrix between ܵ  (shareholders) and ܯ  (cross-border M&A), where ௜ܵ 
represents each of the shareholders of Chinese listed companies, ܯ௝ represents each of cross-border M&A, and 
௜ܺ௝ represents the investment relationships (or the affiliation relationships) between the shareholders of Chinese 
listed companies and their cross-border M&A, which is defined as follows: 
൜ ௜ܺ௝ ൌ ͳǡ  ௜ܵ ݌ܽݎݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݁ݏ݅݊ܯ௝
௜ܺ௝ ൌ Ͳǡ  ௜ܵ ݀݋݁ݏ݊݋ݐ݌ܽݎݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݁݅݊ܯ௝ ሺͳሻ 
 
 
Figure 3 The relationship matrix of shareholders and cross-border M&A (S–M).m=542, n=307. 
The measurement of centrality in two-model network analysis is quite different from that in one-mode 
network [36-37]. Following Faust [21], we employ degree centrality (DC) and betweenness centrality (BC) of 
  ܯͳ … ܯ݊  
ͳܵ ͳܺͳ … ͳܺ݊  
… … … … 
ܵ݉  ܺ݉ͳ … ܺ݉݊  
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2-model network to evaluate the direct experience learnt by doing and indirect experience learnt by alliances in 
cross-border M&A. 
Direct experience. Degree Centrality (DC), is one of the most straightforward centrality indices, which 
measures the direct experience learnt by doing. In an affiliation network motivations for degree centrality are 
that actors are important because of their level of activity or the number of contacts that they have, as we 
describe in expression (2). We explicate the following abbreviated mathematical symbols. ݄ is the number of 
total cross-border M&A. 
ܦܥ௜ ൌ
σ ௜ܺ௝௝
݄ ሺʹሻ 
Indirect experience. In calculating the betweenness centrality (BC) of an M&A in an affiliation network, 
ܤܥ̴ܵ focus on the collection of events that belong to that actor, which measures the indirect experience learnt 
by alliances. An actor is on a geodesic between all pairs of events that are members of it. If a given pair of 
shareholders, ( ௝ܵ, ௝ܵᇲ), only shares ܯ௜ in common (thus ݔ௝௝ᇲெ ൌ ͳ) then ܯ௜ is on the only geodesic between them, 
and ௜ܵ 's betweenness is incremented by 1. Actually, ( ௝ܵ, ௝ܵᇲ) share ݔ௝௝ᇲெ  memberships, thus ௜ܵ 's betweenness is 
incremented by ͳ ݔ௝௝ᇲெൗ  for each pair of shareholders ( ௝ܵ, ௝ܵᇲ) in ܯ௜. ܤܥ௜ can be expressed in terms of the number 
of co-memberships of pairs of its members as the following (3). 
ܤܥ௜ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ ෍
ͳ
ݔ௝௝ᇲெெೕǡெೕᇲאௌ೔
ሺ͵ሻ 
 
Figure 4 The schematic diagram of 2-model Network 
We make an illustration based on an easy example in Figure 5. The schematic diagram shows that five 
shareholders take part in three cross-border M&A. Since ଵܵ participates in (ܯଵ,ܯଶ), the degree Centrality (DC) 
of ଵܵ is ʹ ͵Τ . While ( ଵܵ,ܵଶ), ( ଵܵ,ܵଷ), ( ଵܵ,ܵହ) share a cross-border M&A, ( ଵܵ,ܵସ) share two cross-border M&A. 
Then, the betweenness Centrality (BC) of ଵܵ is ሺͳȀͳ כ ͵ ൅ ͳȀʹሻȀʹ ൌ ͹ȀͶ. 
Ownership structure (OS). Following the recommendations of Sambharya (2000), this study employs a 
variety of diversification measures in this study. The Herfindahl measure refers to the index corrected for the 
inverse coding. The second diversification metric is the Jacqemin–Berry Entropy measure of diversification. 
We utilizes this definition for robustness test: σ ௜ܲ௜ ሺͳȀ ௜ܲሻ. 
4.3. Control variables 
We controlled for the effect of Acquirer and host country. The effect of Acquirer includes firm size, firm age, 
industry, ownership, revenue, and ROA. We measured firm size as the natural logarithm of total assets, lagged 
by one year. Firm age equaled the total number of years since the firm’s inception. We controlled for industry 
and ownership by coding a dummy variable (1 if they belonged to manufacturing, 0 otherwise; 1 if they 
belonged to state-own enterprises, 0 otherwise). We next controlled for the influence of revenue and ROA, 
lagged by one year.To capture conditions in foreign markets, we add GDP per capita, technological 
readiness and culture distance. We controlled for real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars), 
measured as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Technological readiness indicates the level of 
technological development of host country from the Global Competitiveness Report compiled by World 
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Economic Forum for the period of 2005–2014. Then, we control culture distance by calculating the gap 
between China and host country based on the method of Hofstede [27] [38]. In addition, we included 9 
dummy variables for the different years in the sample to control for time trends. 
5. Results 
5.1. Two-model Network of Shareholders 
 
Figure 5   2-model Network of Chinese listing shareholders in cross-border M&A during 2004-2014 
Note: ABC: Agricultural Bank of China; BCM: Bank of Communications; BOC: Bank of China; CAM: China Asset Management 
Co.,Ltd.; CCB: China Construction Bank; CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation; E fund: E Fund Management Co., Ltd. ; GJS: 
Guotai Junan Securities Co., Ltd.; HKSCC: Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Ltd.; ICBC: Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China; RBS: RBS China Investments S.à.r.l.; SSF: National Council for Social Security Fund; 
In the cross-border M&A and shareholders affiliation network, shareholders can only be directly connected 
via cross-border M&A and not by other shareholders. Therefore, for the measurement of centrality, a different 
method and interpretation are used than those used in one-mode network analysis [36-37]. The structural 
composition of the network was described and visualized using UCINET 6.287 [36] in Figure 6. To calculate 
the degree in UCINET, the two-mode matrix was transformed into a bipartite one-mode representation, while 
normalized degree was obtained via the two-mode data procedure in UCINET [36]. 
5.2. Regression analysis 
Table 2 present estimation results of logistic models explaining the likelihood of successful cross-border 
M&A. Testing Hypotheses 1a, we introduce the hypothesized direct international experience measured by 
degree centrality. Results in Model I-2 show that shareholders’ direct international experience learnt by doing 
have strongly significant and positive effects on cross-border M&A, in line with our theoretical expectations in 
Hypotheses 1. Prior entry experience, representing firm-specific tacit knowledge, face fewer local knowledge 
disadvantages and overcome obstacles to a foreign market entry. Direct international experience learnt by doing 
China LifeCNPC
ICBC
E fund
CAM
RBS
BOC
BCM
HKSCC
SSF
GJS
CCB
ABC
UBS AG
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help improve the successful probability and commitments to cross-border M&A.  
In Model I-3, indirect international experience measured by betweenness centrality is significant and 
positive, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Cross-border M&A as collections of shareholders create conduits for the 
connection of pairs of shareholders. Partners in a cross-border M&A share and gain their international 
experience, leading to firm-specific explicit knowledge. Indirect international experience learnt by alliances 
also help overcome the liability of foreignness. 
Then, we considered the moderate effects of ownership structure of firm on the relationship between 
different international experience and cross-border M&A. Results in Model I-4 represent highly concentrated 
ownership structure helps strength the positive relationship between direct international experience and cross-
border M&A. In firms with highly dispersed shareholders, “free riding” and “voting with their feet” are 
relatively common [14]. Their nonfeasance lead to few direct international experience and impede enterprise 
internationalization. On the contrary, in firms with highly concentrated shareholders, major shareholders take 
an active part in cross-border M&A and cultivate specific tacit knowledge, resulting to facilitate firm 
internationalization. 
Furthermore, in H2b we suggested that firms with concentrated ownership would weaken the relationship 
between centrality of shareholders and cross-border M&A, supported by the results in Model I-5. The 
relationship between shareholders in firms with concentrated ownership are stable and reliable, which is called 
“strong ties”, leads to invalid exchange of homogeneous explicit knowledge. Nevertheless, since speculative 
trading is the main governance mechanism [31], pair shareholders in firms with highly dispersed ownership 
forms “weak ties” with low entry barriers and exit barriers. Through capitalism alliances [7] or strategic 
alliances [8], they share and communicate heterogeneous explicit experience and information. Ultimately, weak 
ties between dispersed shareholders will help cross-border M&A. 
Table 1 Estimation results of fixed effects logistic models 
Dependent variables:  
M&A success Model I-1 Model I-2 Model I-3 Model I-4 Model I-5 Model I-6 
H1: Direct experience (DC) 0.088*** 0.055** 0.045*** 
H2: Indirect experience (BC) 0.018*** 0.010* 0.009* 
H3: Direct experience * OS 0.074** 0.045* 
H4: Indirect experience * OS -0.004* -0.002** 
Firm size -0.096 -0.168 -0.106 -0.096 -0.175 -0.158 
Firm age 0.196** 0.212** 0.194*** 0.188*** 0.223*** 0.208*** 
Industry 0.004 -0.010 -0.001 0.007 -0.010 -0.001 
Ownership -0.033 -0.056 -0.037 -0.023 -0.042 -0.047 
Revenue 0.051 0.041 0.052 0.055 0.040 0.040 
ROA 0.040** 0.041** 0.039** 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 
OS 0.064 0.051 0.043 0.071 0.071 0.003 
GDP per capita 0.638*** 0.584*** 0.618** 0.674** 0.615*** 0.568*** 
Technological readiness 0.154*** 0.179*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.141*** 0.134*** 
Culture distance 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood (LL) -135.58 -123.32 -125.23 -117.88 -120.89 -105.88 
F 86.69*** 82.61*** 81.05*** 81.13*** 69.29*** 69.09*** 
Pseudo R2 0.807 0.810 0.808 0.815 0.811 0.828 
1077 Chenxi Guo and Ping Lv /  Procedia Computer Science  55 ( 2015 )  1069 – 1078 
     *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. N= 307.  
 
 
Figure 6 Moderating effects of ownership structure 
However, since statistical significance does not equal economic significance, very small coefficients may 
have little economic impact. Therefore, to explain better the moderating effects of ownership structure, we have 
graphically presented these relationships in Fig. 7. 
6. Conclusions 
Both the prior entry international experience learnt by doing and the effect of direct international experience 
have been widely understood in firm internationalization. The central argument in this paper has been that this 
is not inconsistent with the idea that the source of international experience are respectively learnt by doing and 
learnt by alliances from two-mode networks of shareholders and cross-border M&A, forming direct 
international experience and indirect international experience. In addition, ownership structure have different 
moderate effect on the relationship between international experience and cross-border M&A. We find robust 
support for our theory about the effect of international experience and moderate effect of ownership structure 
on cross-border M&A. Consistent with the analysis of past studies [13], traditional international experience can 
be acquired and applied across its international operations, but it is ignored that firms can acquire or gain 
access to international experience from other sources, such as alliances with internationally experience firms. 
Empirically, we contribute in several ways. First, ours is among the first papers in the international 
experience effects literature to take into account the different sources---the direct and indirect international 
experience. We are able to do this by estimating two-mode networks using cross-border M&A data on Chinese 
listed firms in our sample. In contrast, most prior literature has focused on only direct international experience 
[5]. Second, we assess disparate moderate effect of ownership structure on the relationship international 
experience and cross-border M&A shown in Fig. 6. 
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